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Abstract
In this paper we summarise our previous results on the effectiveness of different kinds of labour
market training programmes as well as employment programmes in East Germany after unifica-
tion. All the studies use the microeconometric evaluation approach and are based on different
types of matching estimators. We find some positive earnings effect for on-the-job training and
also some positive employment effects for employment programmes. No such effects appear for
public sector sponsored (off-the-job) training programmes. Generally, the scope of such analysis
is very much hampered by the insufficient quality and quantity of the data available for East
Germany. Although in particular the results for public sector sponsored training programmes
raise serious doubts about the effectiveness of these programmes, any definite policy conclusion
from this and other studies about active labour market policy in East Germany would probably be
premature.
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1 Introduction
After unification the East German economy changed quite dramatically. On the labour market
under- and unemployment rose. Programmes of active labour market policy (ALMP) were set up
to adjust the skills of the East German labour force as well as to combat unemployment directly.
Quickly a huge number of people participated in these programmes, but at the same time ALMP
absorbed considerable amounts of resources. In some years the Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, the
German labour offices, alone spent more than 30 billion DM on ALMP in East Germany. In ad-
dition to that the private sector also spent considerably on on-the-job training.
In this paper we summarise our evaluation results for public employment programmes (Eichler,
Lechner, 1998), public-sector sponsored training programmes (Lechner, 2000) as well as for on-
the-job training not sponsored by the public sector (Lechner, 1999a). Let us consider the different
parts in turn.
Public employment programmes (Arbeitsbeschaffungsmassnahmen, PEP) are an important part of
ALMP. PEP create additional jobs in the public or private sector through a wage subsidy paid by
the labour office. More than two million people participated in some kind of PEP between 1990
and 1998. The main goal of PEP is the reduction of unemployment, directly as well as by
improving employment chances of PEP participants on the regular labour market, by providing
work experience and informal as well as some formal training.
Public sponsored training is another part of ALMP. Here we focus on continuous training and
retraining (berufliche Fortbildung und Umschulung, CTRT). The hope was CTRT could be used
to quickly adapt the qualification of a labour force that was considered well trained by COME-
CON standards, so to smooth the transition considerably. Here as well more than two million
participated in CTRT between 1990 and 1998.
The third 'programme' considered here is on-the-job training (OJT). This should not be under-
stood in the way that the form of training is 'on the job', but that the training is related to a current
employer and that the employer bears (at least part of) the costs, regardless of the form or the
provider of training. Although knowledge about OJT is less complete, there is no doubt that it is
important. In the early nineties about a quarter of the employed persons participated in some kind
of OJT every year.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 318
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Given the considerable expenditures for these efforts it is obvious that there is scope for an
evaluation of the effects of these programmes. Here we concentrate on the micro effects, i.e. the
individual effects in terms of labour market outcomes for the participants in these programmes.
Finding positive effects on the individual level appears like a necessary condition for overall
positive effects, but it is of course not sufficient. Displacement effects could over-compensate the
positive effects, but this is beyond the scope of this paper.
Since experimental data on the programmes are not available, every microeconometric evaluation
faces the problem of selection bias due to a correlation of individual programme participation
with the outcomes under investigation. Without assumptions the effects of the programmes can-
not be disentangled from the effects of selective participation. For the training evaluations the
empirical work is based on an informative panel data set – the German Socio Economic Panel
(GSOEP). The informative data together with plausible ‘exogeneity’ assumptions derived from
the specific structure of the German unification process leads to the identification of the pro-
gramme effects. To be specific, the key point is that, conditional on a rich set of observable fac-
tors including for example the individual employment histories on a monthly basis, participation
in the programmes is a random event (conditional independence assumption, CIA).
Unfortunately, the GSOEP is not very suitable for studying PEP. One alternative data available is
the Arbeitsmarktmonitor Sachsen-Anhalt (AMM-SA), a panel based on the working age popula-
tion of the state of Sachsen-Anhalt (only). Although the data has several drawbacks, it is in our
opinion currently the best data available for evaluating PEP in (a part of) East Germany. Never-
theless, the data is less informative than the GSOEP in several key respects, so that the above
mentioned CIA approach cannot be used directly. Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997) propose
an alternative that is attractive in our case. The idea is to use comparisons between participants
and selected groups of non-participants as well as differencing over time to eliminate selection
bias. Because in our case individuals start PEP at different dates, we extend their approach and
combine it with a particular matching approach suggested by Lechner (1999b).
Of course there are many alternative ways to identify the effects of programme participation or
more generally of ‘treatments’ (see for example the surveys by Angrist and Krueger, 1999, and
Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999). Some of them are used for East Germany as well. The
advantage of assumptions like CIA that do not involve parametric function form assumptions of
conditional expectations or distributional assumptions for error terms is that checking their valid-William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 318
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ity is much more straightforward. Parametric assumptions are usually difficult to justify by eco-
nomic reasoning and are often difficult to communicate to non-econometricians. In addition
Ashenfelter and Card (1985) and LaLonde (1986) - among others - find that the results are highly
sensitive to different (plausible) stochastic assumptions made about the selection process.
When identification is achieved by nonparametric assumptions, it appears to be ‘natural’ that
estimation is also conducted nonparametrically. Matching methods (e.g. Rubin, 1979, Rosen-
baum and Rubin, 1983, 1985)  have received renewed attention in the literature as a non-
parametric estimator useful for evaluation studies (e.g. Dehejia and Wahba, 2000, Heckman,
Ichimura and Todd, 1998). It closely resembles the typical estimator used in ideal social experi-
ments: The difference between the mean of the outcome variable in the treatment group and the
mean in the comparison group. The comparison group consists typically of individuals who ap-
plied for the programme but who are randomly denied participation. Therefore, their only sys-
tematic difference compared to the participants is their participation status. Prototypical matching
estimators mirror this approach by choosing a comparison group from all non-participants such
that this group is - in the ideal case - identical to the treatment group with respect to the variables
used in the particular formulation of the CIA. This simple idea can be combined by matching
before and after the programmes. The assumption involves that there is no effect of the
programme before actually participating. Therefore, any estimated effect of 'programme
participation' for a date before the participation took place is considered an estimate of the bias
and subtracted from the estimated effect after the programme.
We find some positive earnings effect for on-the-job training and also some positive employment
effects for employment programmes. No such effects appear for public sector sponsored (off-the-
job) training programmes. Generally, the scope of such analysis is very much hampered by the
insufficient quality and quantity of the data available for East Germany. Although in particular
the results for public sector sponsored training programmes raise serious doubts about the effec-
tiveness of these programmes, any definite policy conclusion from this and other studies about
active labour market policies in East Germany would probably be premature.
This paper is organised as follows: The next section outlines basic features of the East German
labour market after unification. Section 3 provides information on the institutional regulations for
the evaluated programmes and Section 4 introduces the data used in these studies. EconometricWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 318
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issues and the empirical implementation are discussed in Section 5. The subsections of Section 6
contain the evaluation results for OJT, CTRT and PEP respectively. Section 7 concludes.
2 Labour market and active labour market policy in East Germany
The centrally planned economy of the GDR was not prepared for the unification in 1990. The
institutional settings of the West German market economy, the relative prices and the interna-
tional competition came as a shock. The GDP per capita, already far below that of West Ger-
many, dropped sharply following the Economic, Monetary and Social Union in July 1990.
1 In
1991 it was about a quarter of the West German one. From 1991 to 1994 the GDP rose with an
annual rate of 6-8% and GDP per capita reached approximately 50% of the West German level in
1994. At the same time labour productivity increased from 31% to 51% of the West German
level. However, this was offset by the development of wages rising from 48% of the West
German level in 1991 to 73% in 1994. This led to economic disequilibria, especially on the
labour market.
Figure 1 illustrates the labour market developments. It presents the size of different labour market
states and ALMP in relation to the total labour force of 1989. The East German regular
(unsubsidised) employment dropped from 9.7 million in 1989 to 5.6 million in 1992 and
remained around that level ever since. Those people who lost regular employment either went
into that part of the labour market dependent on ALMP, became unemployed, or left the labour
force.
2 After unification the majority of people not working was absorbed by ALMP. In 1993 and
1994 the shares of people who went into ALMP, unemployment or out of the labour force were
roughly of the same magnitude. In 1992 more than 30% of the number of people working in 1989
were subsidised in one way or another by the labour offices. This share declines but rather
slowly, e.g. in 1994 still more than 20% were subsidised. Compared to currently working people
the respective shares are close to 40% in 1992 and 30% in 1994.
Two major explanations were given for the fast rising under- and unemployment in East Ger-
many after unification. First, there was a decreasing total demand for labour. Second, a huge part
of the human capital accumulated by the labour force of the previous GDR was loosing its value,
while essential capabilities for the new economic situation were missing. ALMP as well as other
                                                          
1 The GDP figures given in this section are contained in Statistisches Bundesamt (1992, 1995), the data on
productivity and wages in Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft (1995).William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 318
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public and private strategies were initiated to counteract this development. Obviously, training
was the first and the most important strategy to reduce the qualification mismatch. That includes
a wide variety of kinds and contents of training, like 'learning by doing' in a new job, few hours
or days 'introduction to PC working' and two years training for a new profession. The same vari-
ety can be found in organisation and financing: public, by firms, individually or any combination.
Short time work, wage subsidies and public employment programmes are supposed to provide
further qualification as well, either explicitly with training parts included or implicitly through
work experience. But their major goal was to reduce unemployment directly through the increase
in labour demand. Early retirement programmes had the same goal, but by decreasing labour
supply.
Figure 1: Development of the East German labour market since unification
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Source: IAB (1995), Figure 7.2 C, Figure 2.4.1, phone and fax information from IAB, own calculations.
Note: 100% is equal to 9.7 million people in the active labour force in 1989. 'Employment' is corrected for employment pro-
grammes and short time work to avoid double counting. All labour market policies and unemployment are assumed to
be zero in 1989. All numbers are average participation throughout the year and full time equivalents. Other ALMPs are
excluded because of low participation.
The target of our evaluations are individual gains from participation on labour market outcomes
like employment or income after the end of the programme. Therefore, the summery of labour
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market measures below focuses on the most important programmes in this respect, i.e. on-the-job
training (OJT), public sponsored training (continuous training and retraining, CTRT) and public
employment programmes (PEP).
OJT is a very heterogeneous kind of training. It comprises a few hours introduction to a new
workplace as well as several months of formal training with an external provider. There is no
straightforward definition on what is part of OJT and what is not. It must be related to a current
employer, and we use the fact that an employer bears (at least part of) the costs of training as the
indicator for OJT, which means here that training took place during working time. It has to be
mentioned that in East Germany not all OJT must be related to the participant’s (future) job, as
would be expected. At the time in questions their were still a lot of GDR firms not privatised. If
kept alive by subsidies one of their purposes was to provide training to their employees regard-
less whether it was expected useful to the firm or not. Training in this case might be quite differ-
ent from other firm related training.
The other important way to provide training to the East German labour force was training subsi-
dised by the labour offices. In this case, it is the labour office who bears (most of) the cost of
training, the direct cost as well as the cost of living during that time. The training separates into
four broad categories. First, continuous training (CT) in addition to an occupation someone al-
ready holds. Second, retraining for a new occupation (RT), typically more intensive and longer,
often ending with an examination of the German apprenticeship system. Third, very short courses
to find out about the abilities and interests of the participant, to inform about the subsidies avail-
able from the labour office and/or to provide basic job search skills (SHORT). Although many
persons participated in this kind of training it is less important with respect to expenditures. Fur-
thermore, the special regulations providing short courses were abolished in 1993. Fourth, the la-
bour office subsidised the introduction to new workplaces. Because this is related to a specific
workplace for the individual it is more like a wage subsidy, and the effect might be different from
the other kinds of public sponsored training. Therefore, we do not include this in the evaluation
of CTRT.
A second large publicly financed programme is PEP. The idea is to create additional jobs by pro-
viding a wage subsidy to an employer, either a public employer, a non-profit organisation or – in
some cases – a private firm targeted at previously unemployed or at people who might become
unemployed. In East Germany the labour offices often carried a very substantial part of the wage,William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 318
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up to 100%, and in addition some of the set-up costs for the workplace. Apart from the direct
reduction of unemployment and the 'social' motivation of income substitution, PEP is also ex-
pected to provide some kind of 'training on the job' and 'work experience' to the participants.
Furthermore, sometimes formal training parts were included in PEP.
Especially in the years 1991 and 1992 short time work (STW) was an important instrument of
ALMP.
3 Not in accordance with the 'temporary shortage' definition of the original regulation,
STW in East Germany was also used when the remaining working time was zero and a later lay
off was obvious or already scheduled. Generally, we do not include STW in the evaluation for
several reasons: It was used only for a brief period, it was very heterogeneous, the purpose of the
STW is different, and the necessary information is not available. The exception is training during
STW. Often training took place during STW with zero (!) working hours, which was comparable
with CTRT. Therefore, it is included in the evaluation.
The last of the major instruments of ALMP to be mentioned are early retirement schemes. But
since they do not have any effect on the labour market outcomes other than removing people
from the labour force, they are excluded from this evaluation study.
Table 1 provides an overview on the participation in the programmes. Unfortunately, not much
consistent and complete information is available for OJT. But even using only the little informa-
tion available it is clear that OJT provides an important part of training received by the East Ger-
man labour force. The numbers presented in Table 1 show that in every year from 1990 to 1994
between one and a quarter and two and a quarter of a million people participated in OJT , which
is roughly equal to 15% to 25% of all people employed in November 1990. 1990 about 30% of
employees participated in OJT within the last 12 months, 8% of them in workplace introduction,
11% in training courses within the firm and 11% in training outside the firm. In 1992 the total
rate decreased to 25%, but with an increasing share of external training (4%, 7%, and 14%,
respectively). Wahse and Schaefer (1993) have found a comparable amount of OJT in a sample
of firms already existing in the former GDR independent on whether the firm was already
privatised or not. For 1992 iwd (1994a) reports that for every 100 employees there were 50
participants in OJT.
4 On the one hand this is lower than the corresponding number for West
                                                          
3 In case of a temporary reduction of output a company can introduce STW. Employees work a reduced number of
hours. The resulting income loss is partially made up by payments from the labour office.
4 On employee can participate in more than one OJT. Therefore, this is not equal to every second employee
participating in OJT.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 318
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Germany, but on the other hand a participant in East Germany spends an average of 96 hours in
training, nearly four times as long as in West Germany.
Table 1: Participants starting a training programme or a PEP in East Germany
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
OJTa) 2244 1546 1765 1712 1343 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Public spon. training 94b) 892 888 294 287 257 269 166 236
thereof: womenc) ( % ) n . a . 6 06 66 26 77 06 65 9 n . a .
CT n.a. 443 462 182 199 184 204 128 n.a.
RT n.a. 130 183 81 69 53 48 27 n.a.
short n.a. 187 129 --- --- --- --- --- ---
workplace n.a. 133 113 31 19 20 17 11 n.a.
PEP n.a. 422 296 313 356 279 283 243 528
thereof womenc) ( % ) n . a . 3 74 44 15 65 85 85 35 2
Sources: ANBA (1992-9) and own estimates based on Hübler (1998), Table 1.
Notes:  In thousand persons; n.a.: not available. OJT: On-the-job training; Public Spon. Training: Training sponsored by the
Bundesanstalt für Arbeit; CT: Continuous training; RT: Retraining; Short: Short courses according to §41a AFG, not
possible from 1993 on; Workplace: Subsidy during introduction to a new workplace; PEP: Public employment pro-
grammes.
a) Estimated based on results from Hübler (1998), Table 1. Numbers should be somewhat downward biased, because
only people employed in November 1990 are included. b) Sep. to Dec. only. c) Share of women in %.
Judged by the number of participants public sector sponsored training was less important, but
nearly 0.9 million individuals starting training in the peak years 1991 and 1992 is still a substan-
tial share of the labour force.
5 Measured by average training duration as well as intensity, it is
even more important than OJT. For 1990 the average duration is above six months and it is in-
creasing over time. Most of the courses are full time. Observing the development of participation
after the massive build-up in 1990/1991, the first feature to notice is a substantial drop from 1992
to 1993 followed by more or less stable participation, with a downward exception in 1997.
Yearly participation after 1992 is around 3.7% of the labour force or between 10% and 20% of
the unemployed (including participants in ALMP). Because introduction at a new workplace was
not very important from 1993 on, the figures for CTRT are about similar. For PEP participation is
also substantial, but without a clear pattern over time. Between 13% and 20% of the unemployed
took part in a PEP, which is equal to 3% to 5% of the labour force. Altogether there were more
than two million entries in a PEP in East Germany after unification.
Expenditures once again highlight the importance of the programmes. For OJT there are again no
complete statistics. For 1992 iwd (1994b) reports expenditures of 3.5 billion DM on OJT in EastWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 318
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Germany. Although being substantial, they are small compared to the expenditure of the em-
ployment office for training of more than 11 billion DM. This again points to the fact that public
sponsored training was much more intensive than OJT. Table 2 shows the development of ex-
penditures for different public labour market programmes.
Table 2: Expenditures of the labour offices in East Germany (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit)
Expenditures 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Public Spon. Training 181 4735 11281 10396 7032 7314 7234
PEP 56 3075 7784 8900 8137 8230 8155
STW 1171 10006 2653 919 499 424 435
Early Retirement 11 2678 9312 13410 9006 2214 133
total 1419 20494 31030 33625 24674 18182 15957
Sources: ANBA (1992-9).
Note:  In million DM. Public Spon. Training: Training sponsored by the Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, including CT (continuous
training), RT (retraining), short courses according to §41a AFG, and subsidy during introduction to a new workplace; in-
cludes course expenditures and living subsidies (Unterhaltsgeld). PEP: Public employment programmes. STW: Short
time work.
3 Institutional regulations
The following sections provides some insight in the regulations and the participation decision
process of the programmes evaluated.
6 An understanding of these processes is necessary to asses
the identifying assumptions.
During our evaluation periods all public sponsored labour market programmes were regulated by
the Arbeitsförderungsgesetz (AFG).
7 Public sponsored training as discussed here relates to con-
tinuous training and retraining (CTRT, berufliche Fortbildung und Umschulung) regulated
mainly in §§33-49 AFG. The public employment programmes (PEP) contain regular Arbeits-
                                                                                                                                                                                           
5 This and the following number are own calculations based on several issues of the ANBA (1992-9).
6 Apart from formal sources this section relies on informal sources as well to catch effects of the daily
implementation and the use of exceptions. The major informal source were interviews we conducted in East
German labour offices in 1996 and 1997. The interviews were partly questionnaire-led, partly free conversation
held in local labour offices and the Landesarbeitsämter, the regional head offices. For more information on the
public sponsored programmes see the AFG, the Sozialgesetzbuch III, and corresponding regulations on lower
levels.
7 In early 1990 the German Democratic Republic (GDR) adopted a labour law by and large similar to the West
German one. After unification the West German AFG came into force in East Germany as well, although many
exemptions for East Germany were added. With a vast number of changes, notably major ones early in 1993 and
in January 1994, this law was in force until 1997. It has then be integrated in the German social laws, after an
extended revision now the Sozialgesetzbuch III. All programmes subject of evaluation in this paper followed the
regulations of the AFG. Therefore, the discussion is limited to the regulations contained in the AFG.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 318
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beschaffungsmassnahmen (§§91-96 AFG) and Produktive Lohnkostenzuschüsse Ost (§249h
AFG), that were introduced in January 1993.
It should be mentioned that for East Germany the AFG allowed a lot of exceptions and contained
several special regulations. A complete discussion is far beyond this paper which only provides a
summery on the most important regulations. Therefore, even if a person did not fulfil the condi-
tions stated below, he/she might nevertheless have participated in a programme. Especially if the
labour office considered it necessary to reach 'social' or 'labour market policy' goals.
3.1 On-the-job training in East Germany
Again, only 'anecdotal' information is available for OJT. Because OJT is especially heterogene-
ous and in general no formal rules for participation exist, we can only identify some variables
possibly influencing the participation. Several important kinds of OJT can be separated:
8 Intro-
duction to a new workplace, patent counselling and job rotation, training courses either internal
or with an external provider, informal worker exchange and self-teaching programmes. For the
individual participation decision the job position and the human capital already accumulated are
probably important determinants. Some confirmation is provided by Wahse and Schaefer (1993),
who have found a higher participation for persons with higher education / job position (the results
are not based on a random sample of East German firms). Furthermore, they have found that
participation rates increase with firm size.
3.2 Public subsidised training in East Germany
When discussing the participation process in CTRT one has to separate between the design of a
training courses and the individual participation decision. In Germany, in most cases private
training institutions provide CTRT. The labour office approves the courses if they are considered
cost efficient, of sufficient quality and could be expected to help reaching the gaols of the labour
offices, namely reducing unemployment. In many cases the private training supplier designs a
course, subject to later approval by the labour office. In some cases the labour office requested a
certain kind of course for already chosen participants. Courses may offer an officially accepted
degree, but must not.
                                                          
8 Compare iwd (1993).William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 318
13
The initiative to take part in CTRT and the selection of a certain course regulations offer no clear
guidelines of who is responsible for it. It is possible that the individual wants a specific type of
training, gathers the information about the possibilities, selects a course and finally applies at the
labour office for support. In other cases, the suggestion might come from the case worker in the
labour office. In practise, it is usually a mixture of both.
Before the labour office subsidises an individual to participate in a specific training course sev-
eral conditions related to the individual and to the contents of the course must be met. The labour
office checks if the training is 'necessary' to bring someone unemployed back into work or to
avoid unemployment of somebody directly threatened by it. Until 1995 in East Germany a gen-
eral threat of unemployment was sufficient. Some case workers interpreted that like 'in East
Germany everybody was threatened'. Until January 1994, individuals had a right to a subsidy if
training was necessary.
To participate in CTRT an individual must already hold a profession, otherwise only participation
in training for a first profession is possible, a programme not discussed here. To hold a profession
it is necessary to have either three years of work experience or a degree of the German appren-
ticeship training system. Furthermore, from January 1994 on there is an mandatory waiting pe-
riod of one year after CTRT before the possibility of participating again. Before receiving subsi-
dies a participant must have contributed to unemployment insurance for at least two years within
the last three years,
9 but this period can be extended considerably for a variety of reasons.
In addition to the formal 'before' conditions, the case worker must expect the participant to suc-
cessfully finish the specific training course, to search for employment with mandatory unem-
ployment insurance and to improve the employment chances in the appropriate labour market
considerably. In the interviews it turned out that one of the most important indicators for the case
workers apart from their personal impression and experience was the individual motivation and
activity towards training.
During participation in CTRT the participant can get one or both of two kinds of subsidies. One
is an earnings replacement. From 1990 to 1993 it was higher than unemployment benefits, after-
wards it was the same as unemployment benefits. The second payment covers part or all of the
direct costs of training, among others including course fees, material and travel expenses. During
                                                          
9  Employment in the GDR is treated like a period of contributions if it would have resulted in mandatory
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training the individual as well as the labour office is required to continue job search, but training
should only be left if the potential job promises permanent employment. However, it is expected
and confirmed by the interviews, that search activity during training is much lower. The duration
of CTRT is between two weeks to two years, but exceptions are possible. From March 1993 on
the duration of continuous training is limited to one year, again exceptions possible.
Finally, it has to be stressed that a lot of sources provide hints on huge changes in the quality of
training during the period in question. That includes the quality of the training providers, the
ability for the labour offices to check the provider quality, knowledge about the usefulness of
qualifications on the labour market, improved individual counselling, and last not least the expe-
rience and smoothing of the process after the build up of the labour offices was finished and the
inflow of new persons searching for help decreased. Although all this was a steady process, most
sources point to 1993 or early 1994 as 'turning points'.
3.3 Public employment programmes in East Germany
The first step of the participation process in a PEP is the creation of a specific programme. A
programme supporting employer (PSE), who in East Germany might be a public employer, a
non-profit organisation or a firm, applies at a labour office which has to approve the application.
Especially in the early nineties the process in East Germany was often different and the labour
offices have been much more involved. To avoid mass layoffs when closing a company or a sub-
stantial part of it, the closing part was sometimes completely transferred in a PEP. Another way
was the use of Arbeitsbeschaffungs- und Beschäftigungsgesellschaften (ABG),
10 organisations set
up by a regional or local government or a large company as a kind of 'counterpart' to the labour
offices' active labour market policies. Their specific purpose was to create, organise and admin-
ister ALMP including PEP and CTRT as well as to provide information and support for partici-
pants. PEPs created in different ways might differ substantially with respect to the individual
participation process as well as with respect to the effects of participation, but unfortunately there
is neither - according to our knowledge – any complete statistics available on PEP founding, nor
does our data include any information.
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After the creation of a PEP it is the labour office that decides who gets the job.
11 Formally, the
most important requirement is that an individual is unemployed (at least 6 of the last 12 months)
and entitled to some kind of unemployment payments (or since 1994 social assistance) right
before PEP participation.
12 Individuals facing special difficulties on the labour market are
preferred. Those are the disabled, the unemployed older than fifty, persons below twenty-five
without a vocational degree, the long term unemployed and - a special regulation for East Ger-
many - women. Finally, it is important to notice again that labour offices can depart from all for-
mal requirements for social or labour market reasons.
Typical length of a PEP is one year, the maximum allowed (including extension) twenty-four
months.
13 During the PEP the participant has a regular employment contract with the PSE and
gets paid by the PSE. The labour office reimburse the PSE for part or all of the wage bill and
might as well subsidise workplace set-up costs. The wage is equal to the appropriate Tariflohn
(90% of it after 1994), which is typically higher than unemployment benefits. Even after 1994
this also exceeds quite often the earnings of a comparable job in the private sector. Furthermore,
because participation in PEP is treated as regular employment with respect to social security, it
might extend the entitlement to unemployment benefits. If an individual – or the labour office –
finds a suitable job offer or training programme during the PEP the wage subsidy will end
immediately, regardless of the individual leaving the PEP employment or not. The labour office
as well as the participant is required to search for such possibilities during PEP.
4 Data and deskriptive statistics
4.1 Availability of data
Several data sets are available for a microeconometric evaluation of ALMP in East Germany.
Two of the analysis discussed later use the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), which is
very similar to the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
14 The East German part of the
                                                          
11 Labour offices' staff confirmed in the interviews that neither the employer nor the individual participant has any
influence on the participation decision, although the above discussion might cause some doubts, at least for some
cases.
12 §249h regulations are somewhat less tight, especially having participated in a regular PEP or in intensive STW
right before the start is sufficient.
13 Under special conditions an extension to three years is possible. Maximal duration in §249h is greater.
14 For a more comprehensive English language description of the GSOEP see Wagner, Burkhauser, and Behringer
(1993).William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 318
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GSOEP started in 1990 with a sample of close to 2000 households. The major advantage for the
evaluation is that the GSOEP is very informative with respect to socio-demographic characteris-
tics and especially with current and past employment. Both employment status and sources of
income are available monthly although interviews take place only yearly. Furthermore, the 1993
survey included a special section concerning continuous vocational training. The disadvantage is
the sample size. Moreover, PEP are not very well covered in the GSOEP.
The data used to evaluate PEP is the Arbeitsmarktmonitor Sachsen-Anhalt (AMM-SA), a panel of
all individuals of age 15 to 65 living in the federal state of Sachsen-Anhalt. It started in spring
1992 and is repeated once a year since autumn 1992. For each interview, 6,000 to 10,000 obser-
vations are available. One difficulty arises from the structure over time, which is actually a mix-
ture of cross-section and panel data. The first and the second survey are a panel, but for the third
survey a new cross-section was drawn. After that in every survey previously interviewed as well
as newly drawn individuals are included. Panel mortality in the data is high. The AMM-SA is
also very informative, but with disadvantages compared to the GSOEP. Any information on the
labour market status before 1991 is missing, and from 1991 on labour market status is only avail-
able half-yearly or yearly.
15 Finally, the information available differs substantially from one sur-
vey to the other. A further advantage is the comparable high number of observations in smaller
and heterogeneous region like a federal state. Of course, this is also a disadvantage because it is
far from clear that results for Sachsen-Anhalt could be generalised to all new federal states.
16
4.2 The evaluated programmes
In general we are not interested in any effects of a first education but of training during the
working live. Similar, we do not want to catch effects of (planed) early retirement. Therefore,
Lechner (1998), Eichler and Lechner (1998), Lechner (1999b) and Lechner (2000) use an upper
and a lower age limit. For the studies based on the GSOEP it was required that people worked
full time just before unification.
To capture OJT participation Lechner (1999b) uses the 1993 special GSOEP section on training.
It contains specific questions about the last three continuous vocational training courses that were
either completed in the last three years or are still going on at the time of the interview. The in-
formation provided for these courses includes the starting month of the training, the duration, the
                                                          
15 Later surveys of the panel include a monthly labour market status as well.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 318
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number of weekly hours etc.. Training is only considered if it takes place at least partly during
regular working hours. Its goal is qualification other than retraining for a different occupation and
familiarisation with a new work place. Its duration is 16 hours or more. OJT starts before spring
1993 because of the use of the special survey. Mean duration in full time equivalents is 1.8
months.
For CTRT monthly calendars are used to define participation. Individuals are considered to par-
ticipate in CTRT if they receive benefits or obtain continuous vocational training during STW.
CTRT starts not later than March 1993. The time limit has been chosen to avoid catching effects
of the substantial changes in regulations in 1993 and 1994. The mean of the duration is just below
12 months with only very few observations with more than 24 months.
For PEP the sample structure enforces the restriction to start after March 1991. The beginning of
PEP spells in the sample is concentrated between April 1991 and September 1992 (65% of all
spells). A typical PEP duration is one year, which is confirmed by the sample with 17% of all
PEP spells with an duration of 12 months. The mean of the duration is 14.8 months, the median
12 months, and only very few PEP spells are longer than 24 months.
4.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 3 provides some descriptive statistics for the different samples used, for participants and
non-participants respectively.
17 Notice that the underlying populations differ in all three cases due
to differences in selection rules. The higher average age in the population used to evaluate PEP is
due to different age restrictions. The same is true for the share of females, because the AMM-SA
sample is not restricted to persons working in 1989.
Turning to the differences between participants and non-participants, OJT participants are on
average older and more likely to be males than non-participants. For CTRT it is just the opposite.
For PEP participants and non-participants are more alike, but at least for gender this hides the fact
that early PEP participants where more likely to be male, while later the share of females
increased up to two thirds. The different indicators for education and job position indicate that
training participation increases with human capital already accumulated and higher job position,
                                                                                                                                                                                           
16  See the discussion in Eichler and Lechner (1998).
17 For a more comprehensive description of the samples, see Lechner (1998) for training and Eichler and Lechner
(1998) for PEP.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 318
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regardless of the kind of training. The opposite can be observed for PEP, probably due to the
focus of PEP on persons with special labour market problems.
Table 3: Participants and non-participants in the different samples: selected variables
OJT no OJT CTRT no CTRT PEP No PEP
Variable mean  /  share in %
Age in 1990a) 36 35 33.4 35.1 38.8 38.5
Gender: female 37 45 57 40 52 52
Schooling: highest degree
university entrance degree (12 years) 39 14 30 18 23 28
medium (10 years) 51 62 61 60 54 54
low (8 years or no degree) 9 24 10 22 23 18
Highest professional degree
university 30 9 19 13 15 18
technical school 27 16 17 15 21 24
skilled worker 37 66 58 65 --- ---
Job position in 1990
highly qualified, management 44 17 24 22 n.a. n.a.
master of a trade / craft 7 8 5 7 n.a. n.a.
skilled blue and white collar 45 56 57 55 n.a. n.a.
Employer characteristics (industrial sector) b)
a g r i c u l t u r e 6 1 31 41 31 0 5
heavy industry 8 10 11 10 16 8
light ind., consumer goods, electronics, printing 9 17 30 19 17 5
machine building, vehicle construction 5 5 9 7 --- ---
construction 8 7 6 8 7 10
t r a d e 489838
communication, transport 8 8 4 9 1 7
education, science 13 10 10 12.4 10 15
government c) --- --- --- --- 18 9
other services 26 9 7 13 13 10
observations 222 980 125 1038 1,123 12,565
Source:  Own calculations based on Lechner (1998) and Eichler and Lechner (1998).
Notes:  a) Age in 1993 for PEP sample.
b) For OJT and CTRT samples in 1989, for PEP sample in 1992; notice that possible sector changes since unification
could have taken place already, possibly even into a PEP. Information in the PEP sample is only available for a part of
the observations. Due to a lag of information separation into sectors differs somewhat for PEP sample.
c) For OJT and CTRT this is included in other services.
Not surprising, a fundamental difference between OJT and the other two programmes is the expe-
rience with unemployment before participating. The share of unemployed persons in the group of
OJT participants is below 5% in the last 20 months before participating. For CTRT, the
unemployment rate is around 10% from 20 to 10 months before participation, but increases rap-William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 318
19
idly to about 50% in the month before CTRT.
18 For PEP, a somewhat similar picture emerges,
although it is less precise with only yearly information available. At the last interview before
PEP, the unemployment rate climbed up to 40%. In contrast to CTRT PEP participants face an
unemployment rate of 30% already 3 interviews (2-3 years) before PEP. This reflects the special
focus of PEP on persons with special labour market problems and especially long term
unemployed. CTRT on the other hand is supposed to provide necessary training to improve
employment chances, which might be determined rather quickly once an individual gets
unemployed and seeks consultation in the labour office. The above discussion points out the fact
that the populations taking part in the three programmes are rather different.
For all three kinds of treatments the participation probabilities have been estimated, all based on
probit models but with different specifications. In the case of OJT the population has been split
into three different groups before the estimation, men with job position ‘high qualified, manage-
ment’ in 1990, all other men and women. It turns out that age has only a minor influence on par-
ticipation in all cases. It significantly decreases participation probability only for two special
cases, for the group of men not working in a job position in 1990 characterised as ‘high qualified,
management’ for higher ages and for PEP for persons below the age of 25. As expected from the
descriptive statistics there is no significant influence of gender on PEP participation. For CTRT
we find the expected strong and significant positive coefficient for females. The coefficients for
education and job position reflect in general the expectations as well. For OJT a higher job po-
sition and a university or technical school degree have a positive effect on participation. For
CTRT and PEP participation it is the school achievement which is more influential, more
schooling leading to a higher CTRT participation and holding only the lowest school degree
leading to a higher PEP participation probability. There are some significant effects of different
regions and the industrial sector employed in in 1990, but for more information the reader should
refer to the original studies.
19 Finally, notice that this estimation includes time constant individual
characteristics only. As seen from the descriptive statistic the samples differ a lot in their
individual employment history. For computational reasons this is not included here but will be
taken account for further in the estimation when 'matching'.
                                                          
18 Actually, this number even understates the real facts, because persons in STW before CTRT (e.g. taking part in
training during STW) are not unemployed, but the 'zero STW' in east Germany can be considered just like
unemployment here.
19 Lechner (1999b) for OJT, Lechner (2000) for CTRT and Eichler and Lechner (1998) for PEP.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 318
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5 Econometric methodology and empirical implementation
5.1 The causality framework and the targets of the evaluation
The empirical analysis tries to answer questions like "What is the average gain for programme
participants compared to the hypothetical state of non-participation?" This is the so-called
treatment effect on the treated. The underlying notion of causality requires the researcher to
determine whether participation in treatment has an effect on the respective outcomes, such as
earnings or employment status.
20 Therefore, the framework that appears to be most useful as a
guideline for the empirical analysis is the potential-outcome approach to causality suggested by
Roy (1951) and Rubin (1974).
To facilitate the discussion, the following notation is useful. 
p Y  and 
n Y  denote the potential
outcomes (p denotes participation in treatment).
21 Additionally, denote variables that are
unaffected by treatment - called attributes by Holland (1986) - by X. It remains to define a
treatment participation indicator S, that determines whether person i participates in a treatment
(1 i s = ) or not ( 0 i s = ). The observable outcome is  (1 )
pn
ii i i i ys y s y =+ − . Hence, the causal effect,
for example defined as the difference of two potential outcomes, can never be estimated, because
the  counterfactual (, 0 )
p
ii ys =  or ( , 1)
n
ii ys =  to the observable outcome  i y  is unobservable.
However, the quantity of interest to answer the question placed on the beginning of this section is
the average causal effect of treatment participation for treatment participants,  0 θ :
22
0 : ( |1 )( |1 )( |1 ) ( |1 )
pn p n p n E Y YS E YS E YS g E YS θ =−= = = − = = − = .( 1 )
g
p can be consistently estimated by the sample mean of  i y  in the subsample of treatment
participants. The problem is the term  ( | 1)
n EY S= . Much of the literature on causal models in
statistics and selectivity models in econometrics is devoted finding useful identifying
assumptions to predict the unobserved expected nontreatment outcomes of the treated population
                                                          
20 See Holland (1986) and Sobel (1994) for an extensive discussion of concepts of causality in statistics,
econometrics, and other fields.
21 As a notational convention capital letters indicate quantities of the population or of members of the population and
lower case letters denote the respective quantities in the sample. The units of the sample (i=1,...,N) are assumed to
be the result of N independent draws from this population.
22 E(⋅ |S=1) denotes the mean of the respective random variables in the population of treatment participants.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 318
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by using the observable nontreatment outcomes of the untreated population ( , 0)
n
ii ys =  in
different ways.
23
5.2 Identifying restrictions
5.2.1 Conditional independence assumption
The so-called conditional independence assumption (CIA; Rubin, 1977) can be used to identify
(| 1 )
n EY S= :
|,
n YS X x x χ =∀ ∈ C .( 2 )
CIA means that participation is independent (C ) of the non-treatment outcome conditional on
the values of covariates or attributes x in the space χ . Thus  ( | 1, )
n EY S X x == =
(| 0 , )
n EY S X x == , and  0 θ  is identified. Compared to model-based econometric approaches,
CIA allows to estimate treatment effects directly without imposing functional form or parametric
assumptions that are often imposed when estimating a structural model. Subsequently, we will
denote by  0
CIA θ  the limit of an estimator that is consistent under the CIA assumption
( 0 ˆ lim
CIA CIA
N
N
p θθ
→∞
= ):
() () 0 (| 1 ) | 0 , | 1 | 1
CIA p n p n
XX EY S E EY S X x S g E g x S θ   == − = = = = − =   ;( 3 )
(| 1 )
pp gE Y S == ;      ( ): ( | , 0)
nn gx E Y X x S == = .
To justify CIA, the important task is to identify and observe all variables that could be mutually
correlated with assignment and potential nontreatment outcomes, without being influenced by the
realisation of the treatment status (endogenity problem). CIA implies that there is no important
variable left out that influences nontreatment outcomes as well as assignment given a value of the
relevant attributes. For most evaluation studies of ALMP and training standard reasoning
                                                          
23 This may include the outcomes of participants prior to treatment.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 318
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suggests that X should at least include information on schooling, job training and experience, the
complete labour market history of the person and individual socio-economic characteristics.
A technical problem related to the choice of variables to be included in X is the potential high
dimension of X that complicates the estimation of the conditional expectation. Let P(x) =
P(S=1|X=x) denote the propensity score that is defined as the nontrivial probability (0 < P(x) <
1) of being assigned to a treatment conditional on X. Furthermore, let b(x) be a function of
attributes such that P[S=1|b(x)] = P(x), i.e. the balancing score b(x) is at least as 'fine' as the
propensity score. If CIA is valid, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that
|() () ,
n YS b Xb x x χ =∀ ∈ C  holds, hence:
( | 1 ) {[ | 0 ,( ) () ] | 1 }
nn
X EY S E EY S bX bx S == = = = . (4)
The major advantage of this property is the reduction of the dimension of the estimation problem.
The disadvantage is that the probability of assignment - and consequently any balancing scores
that reduce the dimension of the estimation problem - is unknown and has to be estimated.
It is obvious that the validity of CIA typically requires a very informative data set. It is argued
that the German Socio Economic Panel has the potential of being such data. Thus the evaluation
of the effects of OJT and CTRT using the GSOEP are based on the CIA to identify the effect of
training.
However, the GSOEP does not provide sufficient information on PEP participation, and no other
such informative data is available (yet?). The AMM-SA used in this study has several
shortcomings. Employment histories are only available on a yearly basis. Any information on
employment before or at unification is missing. Therefore we might miss employment dynamics
in the month just before PEP participation. Since unemployment is one important selection
criterion, this will invalidate CIA with our data. In addition to that, the considerable amount of
panel attrition, the redrawing of the sample in 1993 and the refreshing of the sample thereafter
results in a very unbalanced panel design. This leads to relatively short observation periods for
many people and thus for many people we have only short labour market histories. Therefore, it
is necessary to use an alternative identification strategy in that case.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 318
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5.2.2 The Conditional Bias Stability Assumption
For the further discussion of the methods used by Eichler and Lechner (2000) it is useful to
introduce the time dimension explicitly as Y =   21 { ,..., , , YY Y −Τ − −   12 , ,..., } YY Y Τ ,
p Y = 21 { ,..., , ,
pp p YY Y −Τ − −   12 , ,..., }
pp p YY Y Τ  and 
n Y = 21 { ,..., , ,
nn n YY Y −Τ − −   12 , ,..., }
nn n YY Y Τ . The period
between –1 and 1 includes the time in treatment and may be longer than the other periods, in
particular it varies individually. All other periods are equally spaced. -T,...,-1 and 1,...,T refer to
points in time where interviews take place, with the assigned values depending on the distance to
the begin (negative values) and end (positive values) of the individual treatment spell,
respectively. This leads to the following re-definition of the effect of treatment on the treated in
period t:
,0 : ( |1 )( |1 )( |1 ) ( |1 )
pn p n p n
tt t t t t t E Y YS E YS E YS g E YS θ = − == =− == − = ,  ... 1,1,2,... t =− .(1’)
In that framework treatment is defined as participation in a treatment some time in our
observation period (S has no index referring to time). Therefore, we allow for a treatment effect
before participation in treatment.
The idea of the identification strategy is that although CIA may not hold, it may be reasonable to
assume that the bias due to an incorrectness of the CIA is the same for at least one date before a
treatment (τ , τ  < 0) and one date after a treatment (t, t > 0). If the true effect of a treatment is
indeed zero for that date before the treatment, than an estimated treatment effect using CIA for
period τ  gives an estimate of the bias. This bias estimate could be used to correct the estimate of
the treatment effect for the date after the treatment. This assumption is called the bias stability
assumption (BSA) in the remainder of this paper.
The use of BSA as an identifying restriction has several advantages. First, it nests the intuitively
appealing CIA assumption when the treatment effect is zero and CIA is valid before the
treatment. In this case, if BSA and CIA are correct, then the test, whether the estimated effect
assuming CIA before the treatment is zero, is a joint test for CIA and BSA. If  ,0 0 τ θ = , that is part
of the BSA assumption, does not hold, then it is conceivable that CIA is still valid for  0 t > , butWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 318
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BSA is violated.
24 It is of practical relevance that for BSA less information is necessary to
identify  ,0 t θ  than for CIA. It is particularly useful that this generalisation is achieved without the
need to use instruments, because instruments that for example satisfy the strong assumptions of
Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996) are hard to find in general and not available for these
particular applications. When X contains past values of variables that vary over time it is another
practical advantage that the effect before and after the programmes need not necessarily be
estimated using the same sample. Although a panel data set is still useful to keep both biases
small, the length any individual is required to be observed in the panel data set is not prolonged
by the need to observe the same person before and after the programme.
25 Compared to
conventional difference-in-difference estimators,
26 BSA has the advantage of being
nonparametric so that successful identification does not depend on specific functional forms for
the respective expectations. The latter is particularly important for models with qualitative or
binary variables as outcomes, because for such models conventional difference-in-difference
estimators are very much dependent on the particular functional forms assumed.
5.3 Estimation procedures: matching
5.3.1 Matching
Given the choice probabilities or a consistent estimate of them, the terms appearing in equation
(4) can be estimated by any parametric, semiparametric or nonparametric regression method that
can handle one or two-dimensional explanatory variables. One of possible and recently popular
choices of estimators in binary framework was matching (for recent examples see Angrist, 1998,
Dehejia and Wahba, 1999, Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1998, Heckman, Ichimura, Smith,
Todd, 1998, and Lechner, 1999c, 2000). The idea of matching on balancing scores is to estimate
(| 1 )
n EY S=  by forming a comparison group of selected non-participants, that have the same
distribution of the balancing score as the group of participants. In the following we will denote
the non-participants matched to the participants as comparisons. By virtue of the property of
                                                          
24 However, in this case CIA must not involve pre-treatment realisations of outcome variables in the conditioning
set.
25 If we were to use the same treatment participants, we would require that observations remain in the sample for
another (t – τ ) periods (notice that the distance defined by (t – τ ) is not necessarily equal to the corresponding
mathematical calculation).
26 See for example the survey by Meyer (1995).William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 318
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being a balancing score, the distribution of X will also be balanced in the two samples. The
estimator of 
0 (| 1 ) EY S=  is then simply the mean in that selected comparison group. Compared
to kernel estimates, a major advantage of matching is clearly its simplicity and its intuitive
appeal.
27 Advantages compared to parametric approaches are its robustness to the functional form
of the conditional expectations (w.r.t. 
0 (|, 0 ) EY XS= ) and that it leaves the individual causal
effects completely unrestricted and hence allows arbitrary heterogeneity of the effect in the
population.
Note that there is complication compared to standard application of the matching approach. Time
variant attributes and their relative distance to the start of the programmes, like the employment
status just prior to participation, play an important role to make the identifying assumption
credible. However, such a variable could not be observed for non-participants. Lechner (1999b)
suggests to use the following step-wise approach allowing for such variables:
a)  Draw a participant randomly from the sample ;
b)  Compute the relevant variables for all control using the start-date of the participant selected in
step a).
c)  Add these variables to the balancing and find the closest match.
Steps a) to c) are repeated for all participants and appear to be effective in balancing the matched
sample with respect to all relevant variables.
5.3.2 Double matching for the BSA
Since a 'natural' estimator under the BSA assumption  , ˆBSA
tN τ θ −  is the difference of two estimates
using CIA ( ,, ˆˆ CIA CIA
tN N τ θθ − ), we use matching estimators for both quantities separately. In the
following we discuss some further issues related to the specific before-after framework that is
used under the BSA assumption. Let us compare  , ˆBSA
tN τ θ − ,  , ˆCIA
tN θ , and  , ˆCIA
N τ θ  for two cases. First,
assume that X is time-constant, so that both estimators  , ˆCIA
tN θ  and  , ˆCIA
N τ θ  use the same values of the
matching variables X. In that case it appears sensible to use a matching protocol ensuring that the
same comparison observations are used as matches for both estimations. For ease of exposition
                                                          
27  One might conjecture that matching will be superior in small samples, but as of now, the evidence is very limited.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 318
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assume that observations are ordered such that the 
p N  observations participating in treatment are
followed by the (
p NN − ) non-participants. Furthermore denote a comparison observation j
matched to treatment participant i as j(i). Then,  , ˆBSA
tN τ θ −  (= ,, ˆˆ CIA CIA
tN N τ θθ − ) has the following simple
form:
28
, , () , , () , , , () , () ,
11 1
11 1 ˆ ( ) ( ) [( ) ( )]
pp p NN N
BSA p n p n p p n n
t N it jit i ji it i jit ji pp p
ii i
yy yy yy y y
NN N
ττ τ τ τ θ −
== =
=− −− = − − − ∑∑ ∑ ;
0;   
pp iN N jN <≤ < ≤ . (10)
However, if it is the aim to reduce the bias in both  , ˆCIA
tN θ  and  , ˆCIA
N τ θ  used to compute  , ˆBSA
tN τ θ −  (as
seems sensible, but not necessary), the conditioning set should include lagged values of the
outcome variables as well. If YX τ ∈ , then the case  t XX τ =  is no longer sensible because it
implies by definition that  ,0 0
CIA
τ θ =  and hence  ,0 ,0
BSA CIA
tt τ θθ − = .
29
Therefore, it is obvious that there are cases in which the set of conditioning variables depend on
the calendar time a treatment takes place. For example, in the empirical part we consider the
indication of unemployment after a PEP as an outcome variable and the indication prior to a PEP
as a matching variable (see Section 3 for the importance of unemployment as an eligibility
criteria for PEPs). The definition of 'prior to PEP' has to be appropriately changed for the
estimation of  , ˆCIA
N τ θ  by taking the duration of the PEP into account.
Figure 2 clarifies this issue for the case of  1 τ =−  with an example for one PEP participant. In the
evaluation sample we get  , ˆCIA
tN θ . In the bias correction sample we assume an artificial PEP period
to get  1, ˆCIA
N τ θ =− , the effect of the artificial PEP. Because of the BSA ( ,0 0 τ θ = ) and that in fact no
treatment has taken place jet, this is an estimate for the bias. We use it to correct  , ˆCIA
tN θ .
                                                          
28 We could call this a nonparametric difference-in-difference estimator.
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, ˆCIA
N τ θ  will only be exactly zero, if the sample to draw the comparisons from is sufficiently rich to allow for 'perfect'
matches.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 318
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The assumption of random sampling and large N and 
p N  allows for the usual asymptotic
approximation of the variance of matching estimators:
30
, , , ( ), '( ),
1 ˆ () [ ( ) ( ) ]
BSA p p n n
tN i t i j i t j i p Var Var y y Var y y
N
ττ τ θ − =− + −. (11)
Figure 2: Definition of periods for the evaluation sample and the bias correction sample for one
PEP participant when time varying variables are used, τ =− 1
PEP
evaluation
period
1, ˆCIA
tN θ =
evaluation
sample
„matching“
period
artificial
PEP
1, ˆCIA
N τ θ =−
bias correction
sample
 1
calendar
time
 2 -2 -1
2, ˆCIA
tN θ =
„matching“
period
estimate
of  bias
I 93 I 95 I 94 I 96 I 97
relative
time
Note: The  calendar time shows interviews from I 93 to I 97. The relative time is defined according to the PEP participation of
the person in the example (note that in this example the PEP spell includes one interview which is not necessarily the
case). The period artificial PEP has the same duration as the PEP and ends just before the last interview before the
PEP (τ =− 1). The evaluation sample is the sample used to compute  , ˆ CIA
tN θ  and the bias correction sample is the
sample used to compute  , ˆ  
CIA
N τ θ  ( ,, ˆˆ CIA CIA
Nt N BB τ ==  if BSA is valid).
                                                          
30  Note that the following formulas have been obtained using the approximation that the fact that the pairs have been
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6 Major results
6.1  Definition of outcome variable
Our analyses are particularly interested in the effects on post-programme changes in the actual
labour market status. It is due to the nature of the data and the circumstances (German unification
in 1990) that at the time the analyses were conducted no long run effects could possibly be
discovered.
For the analyses of training we can utilise monthly information on employment status as well as
yearly information on gross monthly earnings (in the month of the yearly interview). With
respect to PEP we have to rely only on yearly information on employment status (again in the
month of the yearly interview). It is important to note for the discussion in the following
subsection that, except for the earnings' variable, all outcome variables are coded as binary
indicators.
6.2 Results for on-the-job training (OJT)
The results of the evaluations of OJT are given in the following figures. They show the
differences between the control and the OJT group for specific time spans before and after the
training for a selected group of outcome variables (multiplied by 100 for outcomes that are
indicators). For variables measured using the monthly calendar the distance is expressed in
months, for those only measured for the particular month of the yearly interview, the distance is
expressed in years. The figures cover up to 18 months or up to 3 'years' before the training and up
to 30 months or 3 'years' after OJT. They display the mean effect (solid line; + for the mismatch
corrected estimate) and its 95% point-wise confidence interval based on the normal
approximation (dashed line; ∇ , ∆  for the mismatch corrected estimates).
31
The number of observations available to compute the respective statistics decreases the longer the
distance to the incidence of OJT. This implies that the variances increase over time which is
reflected in the widening of the confidence intervals. Additionally, a mismatch correction may be
impossible or very imprecise, because there may be too few observations to identify and estimate
the parameters of the ordered probit model.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 318
29
Figures 3 presents the results of the evaluations for the monthly outcome variables un-
employment. The part left to the zero vertical mark allows a judgement about the quality of the
matches concerning the particular variable.
32
Figure 3: Difference of unemployment rates in %-points
Note: N
t
− 1 = 185. Smoothed using 3 month moving averages for || τ   > 1. Mismatch correction only available for τ  =1,...,8,
because of insufficient variation of the difference of the outcome variables for τ  > 8.
Figure 3 shows no significant positive effects of OJT. The latter is in line with the findings for
public sector sponsored training presented in the next section. Apparently, it is difficult to reduce
the individual unemployment risk by means of training in a rapidly contracting economy that also
adjusts to a new economic environment, for example because of unforeseen changes in firm
strategies and technologies used, leading to unexpected changes in the size and composition of
the work force, so that even previous OJT may only be of limited value.
Figure 4 shows the average effects of OJT on monthly gross earnings. It appears that there are
positive effects of about DM 350 from OJT in the second year after completion of the last OJT
                                                                                                                                                                                           
31  Mismatch-corrected estimate are computed by regressing the difference in outcomes for each matched pair on the
difference in observable characteristics for each pair. OLS is used in case of earnings, whereas an ordered probit
with three categories (-1, 0, +1) is used for binary outcome variables.
32 Testing whether these lines deviate significantly from 0 is similar to the tests suggested by Rosenbaum (1984).William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 318
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spell.
33 Note that the same effect appears for the third year, but that (probably) the reduced
sample size leads to its insignificance.
When checking, whether the estimated earnings' effects are stable across the population of OJT
participants, a significant difference with respect to job position and occupational degree appears.
For those individuals having a university degree and / or being in a highly qualified and / or
managerial job position, no significantly positive effects are visible. However, for the
complements of these populations, positive effects that already appeared in the population
average in year two after OJT are more pronounced. At least for those not in highly qualified and
/ or managerial job positions, there appears a mismatch corrected positive effect for the third year
after OJT. Note that these differences of earnings effects regarding education and job position
suggest that OJT training and general training are not complementary. Quite the opposite, there
appear to be diminishing returns to education.
Figure 4: Monthly gross earnings (in 1993 DM)
Note: N
t
− 1 = 185. 0 when unemployed.
                                                          
33 The implied average earnings increase is about 9%.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 318
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To see whether the significant earnings gains really translate to additional benefits for partici-
pants, information about the participants' share of the direct and indirect training costs is nec-
essary. Results in Lechner (1998) suggest that, although the type of training appears not to be too
firm specific, most of the cost is paid by the employer. However, it might still be that the firm is
reimbursed by a lower pre- or post-OJT wage. Although exact information on these issues is not
available, the previous figures can give some clues. For example, one may wonder whether the
insignificant effects in the first year may be due to some sort of sharing the additional
productivity between the employer and the employee to make up for training costs, or whether it
takes some time for OJT to result in additional productivity. Considering the pre-OJT earnings, it
appears that there is no significant cost sharing between employers and employees prior to OJT.
Otherwise, the respective figures should show a drop when earnings approach OJT from the left,
because post-unification pre-OJT earnings are not part of the conditioning set (attribute vector).
In conclusion, although there might be some wage restraint in the first OJT year, OJT appears to
be very beneficial for earnings. It appears to have no effect concerning the risk of future
unemployment. These conclusions are confirmed by considering other outcome variables, in
particular those related to future expectations and job position.
6.3 The effect of CTRT
Figure 5 shows the differences of unemployment rates between the CTRT group and the
comparison group. The mean effect up to 24 months before CTRT and up to about 40 months
after CTRT are displayed.
The parts of Figure 5 to the left to the zero vertical mark again allow a judgement about the
quality of the matches concerning that particular variable. Although the number of unemployed
persons is generally higher in the CTRT sample, it is only in the month just prior to CTRT that
the difference is just significant.
Figure 5 also shows that the immediate effect of CTRT is additional unemployment in the
months following the end of CTRT. After some months these negative effects disappear. There is
a simple explanation for this effect: More than 50% of CTRT participants are unemployed before
CTRT. For an unemployed person the immediate effect of (full-time) CTRT is that during CTRT
his or her search efforts will be reduced compared to the comparison non-participants. The results
suggest that if there is a positive effect of CTRT it is not large enough to compensate for thisWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 318
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initial negative outcome, and to be detected by the estimator (note that the confidence bands are
wide enough to make it difficult to exclude the possibility of medium sized positive effects after
about one year as well as of negative effects of CTRT). These general findings are confirmed by
other outcome variables.
Figure 5: Difference of unemployment rates for CTRT participants and selected control group in
%-points
Note: N
t
− 1= 116. Smoothed using 3 month moving averages for || τ  > 1.
Figure 6 features the results for earnings observed only once a year. For the employed, earnings
are defined as gross monthly earnings in the month before the interview. For those not being em-
ployed, either imputed unemployment benefits or - if higher - social assistance or zeros are used
(not shown). There are no significant differences for the pre-training outcomes in both cases, but
there does not appear to be an effect of training either. Note that the estimated earnings effects
are largely driven by employment dynamics.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 318
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Figure 6: Difference of gross earnings (in 1993 DM, including benefits)
Note:  N
t
− 1 = 116.
6.3 The effect of PEP in Sachsen-Anhalt
The discussion of the results will focus on the case we consider most informative, using time
variable matching variables, especially unemployment. Furthermore, this includes the choice of τ
fixed at the interview before PEP, τ  = –1, and an unbalanced design, that is that different
observations for the evaluation sample and the bias correction sample can be used. Among other
reasons one advantage is the reduction of losses of observations to a minimum. Nevertheless, we
tested a wide variety of specifications but did not find substantially different results.
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Figure 7 presents the first part of the results. The vertical axis is the difference in the unem-
ployment rate between the participants taking part in PEP and the comparisons, the unemploy-
ment the participants would have faced had they not participated. A positive number reflects a
higher unemployment rate due to participation in PEP. The results prior to PEP ('-1' in the
evaluation sample, '-2' in the bias correction sample) demonstrate that matching was successful
with respect to unemployment before treatment. The value for  1 − = τ  in the bias correction
sample indicates that there is still a substantial bias in the CIA results (given BSA is correct).
                                                          
34 Some of the results can be found in Eichler and Lechner (1998). Notice that here we used a revised and extended
version of the data. Even for the equal cases there might be some differences in the results. The paper is
downloadable from the Internet at: http:// www.siaw.unisg.ch/lechner/publica/98e01.html.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 318
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Figure 7: 
 CIA  ˆ
N θ computed with time-varying matching variables, unemployment
Note: X-axis: Relative time; Y-axis: Unemployment rate in %. 
Results are in %-points of unemployment. A positive sign indicates that unemployment is XX%-points higher in the PEP
group than in the matched comparison group.
X used for matching: partial propensity, dummies indicating valid interviews in particular wave, pre-PEP full time em-
ployment, pre-PEP unemployment, pre-PEP job position, pre-PEP industrial sector (agricultural, chemical, public), pre-
PEP vocational degree, pre-PEP firm size, pre-PEP unemployment rate in region (only last interview before PEP used).
The evaluation sample is used to compute the effect of PEP if CIA was valid, the bias correction sample is the used to
estimate the bias. 'Treated' is the estimated unemployment rate for participants, 'comparisons' the estimated unem-
ployment rate for participants had they not participated (the unemployment rate of the matched comparison sample),
and 'diff' the difference between these two, 
 CIA  ˆ
N θ .
Figure 8 shows the basic result. The value of –25 for t=1 indicates that there appears to be a
substantial individual gain (i.e. a reduction in unemployment probabilities) from participating in
Bias Correction Sample
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PEP. The average probability of unemployment for an individual in the sample of PEP
participants - equivalent to the unemployment rate in the sample - is reduced from 60% to 35% at
the time of the first interview after PEP ended. The results for higher values of t indicate that this
is not only a short term effect, although the numbers should be considered with care because of
the reduced sample size. Note that the bias correction not only changes but reverses the conclu-
sions that would be drawn if CIA was believed to be valid, even when the richest specification of
matching possible with the available data is used.
Figure 8: 
 BSA 
, ˆ
tN τ θ −  computed with time-varying matching variables, unemployment
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The lower part of Figure 8 provides gender-specific results. Although the estimates are less pre-
cise because of the reduced sample sizes, the differences for the two samples with respect to the
effect of participation on unemployment are not substantial. Checking for the reasons of the re-
duced unemployment, some differences are revealed. For men the reduction in unemployment is
mainly due to a increase in employment. For women, the increase in non-employment (out of
labour force) is substantial as well (Table 4).
Table 4: 
 BSA 
, ˆ
tN τ θ −  for employment and out-of-labour-force
Period () ˆ |1
p
t EY S= () ˆ |1
n
t EY S =
 BSA
, ˆ
tN τ θ − P-value () ˆ |1
p
t EY S= () ˆ |1
n
t EY S=
 BSA
, ˆ
tN τ θ − P-value
employment non employment
women and men women and men
1 54 32 22 .003 12 8 4 .465
2 55 35 20 .029 19 4 15 .018
3 48 40 8 .550 17 – 1a) 19 .038
women only women only
1 41 25 16 .090 17 12 6 .434
2 38 37 1 .925 29 11 18 .090
3 41 30 11 .547 18 -3a) 20 .119
men only men only
1 66 40 25 .026 6 5 1 .912
2 70 43 27 .036 11 2 9 .269
3 58 46 13 .566 17 14 3 .882
Note: Results are in %-points of employment and out of labour force. See note on Figure 7.
a) Negative value due to very small sample size.
7 Conclusions, shortcoming, and future research
In this paper we summarise our previous results on the effectiveness of different kinds of labour
market training programmes as well as employment programmes in East Germany after unifica-
tion. All the studies use the microeconometric evaluation approach and are based on different
types of matching estimators. The evaluation of public and private financed training and public
employment programmes (PEP) in East Germany after unification leads to very different conclu-
sions. Participation in training has no (measurable) effect on future unemployment probabilities,
with the exception of a short-term negative effect of public sponsored training (continuos training
and retraining, CTRT). This is probably due to a reduced search activity during CTRT, which is
not the case for the private training considered here, because participants typically hold a job (on-
the-job training, OJT). It is surprising, that training does not improve the employment probabili-William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 318
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ties, especially in the case of OJT were firms appear to cover most of the costs but do not hold
onto the employees more frequently than without OJT. An explanation compatible with these
results would be that it is very difficult to increase the individual employment probability of
workers by means of training in a rapidly contracting economy where changes in the demand for
skills are not anticipated successfully. But this explanation is not in line with the result that OJT
has a positive effect on earnings. No such effect is found for CTRT. In line with the OJT results
would be an OJT that does not provide firm specific human capital but general skills which
increased the worker's value on the labour market and hence their wage. The firm could substitute
them by other workers for more or less the same costs. Of course in this case there is no other
explanation why CTRT can not provide such general skills than that CTRT is an ineffective
system to provide them or that the population served is different such in a way that it does not
gain from the general skills. In contrast to the above results the effect of PEP participation on
future unemployment probabilities is positive, that is it reduces unemployment. One explanation
would be the training and work experience provided during the PEP, but such an effect would be
rather surprising, especially in the light of the effects for OJT and CTRT on unemployment.
Another explanation might be screening by the PEP employer. The PEP employment is used as a
'trial period' to determine the work capacities of the participant. The focus of PEP on persons
with special labour market problems and long term unemployed makes this explanation more
valuable, because in the labour market situation in East Germany with a huge oversupply, there
might be a very low employment chance for this persons without any help. Finally, there is the
important issue of the shortcoming of all databases currently available for such evaluation studies
that sheds some doubts on all these results.
The problem of no clear-cut policy conclusions is not only a problem for this study but common
to evaluations of active labour market policy (ALMP) in East Germany after unification. Several
other studies are available, differing from the studies presented here and among each other in the
set of identifying assumptions, the estimation methods, the data and finally the definition of the
programme. To mention some recent ones, Fitzenberger and Prey (1999) estimate the effects of
training participation, Hübler (1997) several different ALMP, Hujer and Wellner (1999) training
and Kraus, Puhani and Steiner (1998) evaluate the effects of PEP participation. For a
comprehensive survey see Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2000). These and other studies do not
come to a common conclusion. Vice versa, results are often contradictory. One of the most
important reasons is the data situation, which not only causes the choice of different methods andWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 318
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treatment definitions, but also make it difficult to draw clear solutions based on the low number
of observed cases. Therefore, although most studies appear to be somewhat negative about the
effects, any definite policy conclusion from this and other studies about active labour market
policy in East Germany would probably be premature.
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